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"CHILD DIVORCE": A BREAK FROM PARENTAL RESPONSIBILITIES AND 
RIGHTS DUE TO THE TRADITIONAL SOCIO-CULTURAL PRACTICES AND 
BELIEFS OF THE PARENTS 
 
M Bekink * 
1 Introduction 
 
The twentieth century has seen a dramatic shift in the law regarding the relationship 
between parents and children, both internationally and nationally. Whereas in the 
past the emphasis was on the rights and powers of parents (parental authority), the 
emphasis has moved towards a child-centred approach with the interest of children 
at the forefront.1 Today parental authority is concerned more with parental 
responsibilities and duties, which should be exercised in the interest of children, 
rather than with parental rights and powers.2 Internationally the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child3 has set the stage for the enhancement of 
children's rights with the recognition of children as individuals worthy of protection in 
their own right. Nationally the new constitutional dispensation in South Africa, the 
ratification of the CRC and a recently-enacted Children's Act4 have also given new 
meaning to the protection and the rights of children.5 The Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, containing a comprehensive Bill of Rights, specifically 
protects and advances the rights of children in that it recognises that children, as a 
vulnerable group within society, have specific and unique interests different from 
those of adults, and that these interests deserve special and separate protection.  
 
With the recognition of children as the holders of fundamental rights comes the 
possibility of conflict with the rights of other holders of human rights. This is possible 
especially within the family context, where different fundamental rights can come into 
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1
  Heaton South African Family Law 271. 
2
  Skelton "Parental Responsibilities and Rights" 62. 
3
  This convention was passed by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1989 and was 
ratified by South Africa in June 1994. Herein after referred to as the CRC. 
4
  Children's Act 38 of 2005. 
5
  Mahery "United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child" 309. 
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conflict with one another, for instance between the parents' right to religious freedom 
and their children's rights to life and human dignity.6 This requires a weighing or 
balancing act to determine which right must take preference. This balancing of 
interests often creates tension, which can have serious negative implications for 
those involved within the family context. The focus of this article is specifically 
directed at such a conflict of rights within the family unit between parents and their 
child. 
 
In a recent ground-breaking case the South African courts were requested for the 
first time to use their discretion to interfere in the parent-child relationship, due to the 
traditional socio-cultural beliefs of the parents.7 In what has been described as 
"every parent's nightmare; the fancy of many teenagers", a 16 year-old schoolgirl 
from Milnerton in the Western Cape asked to be "freed" from her parents to live 
semi-independently from them because of her unhappiness with the conservative 
manner in which her parents treated her. According to reports her parents come from 
a very conservative sector of South African society and kept her under constant 
supervision, barred her from talking to boys, communicating with friends on her 
cellular phone, reading what she likes (her parents find Harry Potter inappropriate) or 
even going out with friends after school.8 
 
After considering the matter the judge assigned to the case granted her request to 
live semi-independently with a school friend and her family (called by the judge the 
host family) until she reaches the age of 18 (her majority). Her parents may have 
contact with her for two to three hours a week at a neutral venue and may phone her 
between 8:00 and 8:30 pm on a Tuesday and Friday. Holidays are to be shared 
between the host family and her parents, the first of which was to be taken with the 
                                                 
6
  Bekink 2003 THRHR 246. 
7
  Own emphasis added. 
8
  Legalbrief TODAY, 10 June 2010 available at http://www.legalbrief.co.za/article.php?story= 
20100610091458403 accessed on 15 June 2010. The said case was not reported, as only a 
declaratory order was handed down. Despite attempts by the author hereof to obtain copies of 
the legal arguments presented in court and the order given, the author was unable to obtain such 
documentation from the learned judge or the attorneys representing the girl. The reasons given 
were the sensitivity of the matter and the client's instructions. Reliance is therefore made on the 
media reports of the matter. 
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host family. Despite the fact that she will no longer be residing with her parents, they 
retain their responsibility to contribute to the maintenance of their child.9 
 
This case represents an example of the difficulties involved when balancing the 
rights of a teenager10 against those of the parents in matters of socio-cultural 
practice and belief. In a multi-cultural society such as South Africa the case raises 
numerous serious questions for other families. For instance, what standards will a 
court use to determine if parents are too conservative in bringing up their children 
and what factors will be taken into account? How much freedom and autonomy 
should children be given? How will courts prevent children from misusing the system 
just to get what their friends have? How bad must the situation be before children will 
be allowed to move out of their parents' home to live semi-independently? What role 
does the child's view play? And the ultimate question is are the rights of children 
superior to the traditional rights of parents in matters of socio-cultural practice with 
specific reference to their upbringing? 
 
It is the aim of this contribution primarily to focus on the key questions mentioned 
above. They will be discussed not only from a South African point of view but also by 
taking into account regional and international conventions and legal requirements. 
Possible solutions for striking a balance between the rights of children and of parents 
will also be explored. Before these questions are explored a brief historical overview 
is provided of the development of parental responsibilities and rights in South Africa. 
 
2 The historical development of parental responsibilities and rights 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
In general the development of parental responsibilities and rights can be divided into 
two distinct eras. The first is the era before 1994 and the second refers to the era 
after 1994 when the African National Congress (ANC) came into power. The new 
ruling party introduced a new supreme Constitution with the enactment of the Interim 
                                                 
9
  Legalbrief TODAY, 10 June 2010 available at http://www.legalbrief.co.za/article.php?story= 
20100610091458403 accessed on 15 June 2010. 
10
  Still legally a child. See s 28(3) of the Constitution. 
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Constitution of 199311 and thereafter the enactment of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996.12 Prior to 1994, parental responsibilities and rights 
were dealt with in terms of the common law and relevant statutes such as the 
Divorce Act 70 of 1979, the Matrimonial Affairs Act 37 of 1953, the Child Care Act 74 
of 1983 and the Guardianship Act 192 of 1993. The era prior to 1994 is discussed 
first. 
 
2.2 The pre 1994 disposition 
  
Historically the relationship between parents and children in South Africa is one of 
parental authority or power and illustrates a distinctly paternalistic bias. Children 
simply had to respect the control and authority of their parents, because it was 
accepted that parents knew what was best for their children.13 From the common law 
point of view the relationship between parent and child expressed itself primarily in 
the parental power over a minor child and in the mutual duty of support between 
parent and child.14 This also included the right of parents to demand obedience from 
their children and to punish them in a reasonable and moderate manner.15 The 
concept of parental authority thus entailed that parents had complete control over 
their children. 
 
                                                 
11
  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993. 
12
  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa,1996. Any reference hereinafter will be to the 1996 
Constitution unless specifically stated otherwise. 
13
   Robinson 2002 Stell LR 309. See also Van der Vyver and Joubert Persone en Familiereg 592, 
595. 
14
  Erasmus, Van der Merwe and Van Wyk Family Things 152. 
15
  Visser and Potgieter Introduction to Family Law 199; Van Heerden et al Law of Persons and the 
Family 661; Van der Vyver and Joubert Persone en Familiereg 607. See also R v Janke 1913 
TPD 385; Vucinovich v Vucinovich 1944 TPD 143; Niemeyer v De Villiers 1951 4 SA 100 (T); 
Wolfson v Wolfson 1962 1 SA 34 (SR); Du Preez v Conradie 1990 4 SA 46 (B) 5E-F. The 
married parents of a legitimate child and the mother of an illegitimate child automatically acquired 
all the elements of parental authority. Unmarried fathers of illegitimate children could not obtain 
any elements of parental authority but had to approach the High Court as the upper guardian to 
obtain an order granting them such rights. Finally parental authority could also be acquired by 
means of an adoption order. For more on the acquisition of parental authority see Skelton 
"Parental Responsibilities and Rights" 68; Louw Acquisition of Parental Responsibilities and 
Rights; Van Erk v Holmer 1992 2 SA 636 (W); B v S 1995 3 SA 571 (A); Fraser v Children's 
Court Pretoria North 1997 2 SA 261 (CC); and the Natural Fathers of Children Born out of 
Wedlock Act 86 of 1997. Section 21 of the Children's Act 38 of 2005 now allows for unmarried 
fathers to automatically acquire responsibilities in certain specified circumstances. See also 
Cronjé and Heaton South African Family Law 265. 
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This was, however, subject to the inherent authority of the High Court as the upper 
guardian to intervene in matters relating to parental authority. During the pre-
constitutional period the High Court exercised this authority sparingly and only when 
required to do so.16 Initially the court protected the sanctity of parental authority, as a 
good cause for intervention had to be shown.17 This can be illustrated by the fact that 
it was initially held that special grounds, which inter alia included danger to a child's 
life, health, or morals had to be present before a court would exercise its discretion 
of interference.18 The court later followed a more lenient approach that allowed for 
some interference in family life. In Short v Naisby the court held that each case had 
to be considered on its own merits, with the paramount consideration being whether 
the interest of the child demanded such interference.19 The emphasis was thus 
shifted from "special grounds" to that of "the interest of the child".20 The court in S v L 
21 added that although it has a right as the upper guardian to interfere in family life 
the right was not limitless but should be exercised where the parents were unable to 
properly perform their duties themselves. The court also pointed out that it would not 
interfere with a parent's decision simply because it did not agree with the parents' 
decision.22 Despite applying the principle of "the interests of the child" the pre-
constitutional period of South African family law still tended to lean towards minimal 
state intervention.23 Children were still not seen as members of a family with 
individual rights. This contributed inter alia to the vagueness of the concept of the 
"interest of the child" and the accepted viewpoint at the time that the integrity of the 
family and the autonomy of parents to raise their children as they saw fit should be 
respected.24 
 
The parent-child relationship underwent a dramatic change, however, with the 
enactment of the Constitution and the recognition of children's rights in the 
Constitution itself and its Bill of Rights in particular. 
                                                 
16
  See Calitz v Calitz 1939 AD 56; Short v Naisby 1955 3 SA 572 (D); and Ex Parte D 1958 2 SA 91 
(GW). 
17
  Clark 2001 THRHR 615. 
18
  Calitz v Calitz 1939 AD 56 63. 
19
  See also Horsford v De Jager 1959 2 SA 152 (N); September v Karriem 1959 3 SA 687 (C); and 
Petersen v Kruger 1975 4 SA 171 (C). 
20
  Kruger Judicial Interference with Parental Authority 133. 
21
  S v L 1992 3 SA 713 (E). 
22
  S v L 1992 3 SA 713 (E) 701, 721E-J. See also Kruger 1994 THRHR 304. 
23
  Kruger Judicial Interference with Parental Authority 497. 
24
  Human 2000 THRHR 393-397. 
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3 Constitutional framework 
 
With the enactment of first the Interim Constitution in 1993 and later the Final 
Constitution in 1996, South Africa's legal system changed dramatically from the 
previous system of parliamentary sovereignty to one of constitutional supremacy. 
This change also significantly impacted on the recognition of children's rights. One of 
the essential features of the new Constitution is the introduction of a comprehensive 
Bill of Rights as part of the Constitution, which Bill places a range of obligations on 
the state with regards to the promotion, protection and realisation of children's 
rights.25 With the exception of the right to vote, children are entitled to all of the rights 
in the Bill of Rights. These include inter alia the right to equality, dignity, life, 
freedom, security of the person, housing, health care services, social security and 
education.26 Apart from the rights afforded to everyone, children's interests have 
been given independent recognition in section 28 of the Constitution, which is tailor-
made for children's needs and interests.27 The duties that these rights impose 
operate within an uneasy triangular relationship between the child, the parents and 
the state. The primary duties of care rest on the parents, and pass to the state only 
when the parents are unable to perform such duties. Children's rights would 
therefore mostly apply horizontally between the child and parent before applying 
vertically between the child and the state.28 The rights in the Bill of Rights are not 
absolute but are subject to the limitations contained or referred to in section 36, or 
elsewhere in the Bill.29 The Bill of Rights further confirms that it applies to all law, and 
binds the state and natural and or juristic persons if, and to the extent that it is 
applicable, taking into account certain circumstances.30 Finally, when interpreting the 
Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum must promote the values that underlie an 
                                                 
25
  Section 7(2) of the Constitution. 
26
  Chapter 2 of the Constitution. 
27
  Section 28 of the Constitution. 
28
  Bekink 2003 THRHR 253. See also Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 
2001 1 SA 46 (CC) and Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign 2 2002 5 SA 721 (CC). 
29
  Section 7(3) of the Constitution. Although of particular significance the purview of this paper does 
not allow for a detailed discussion on the limitation of rights. For a more detailed discussion refer 
to Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 145. Note also Woolman and Botha "Limitations" 
34. 
30
  Section 8(1)-(2) of the Constitution. 
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open and democratic society, must consider international law, and may consider 
foreign law.31 
 
3.1 The rights of everyone with particular significance to children 
  
The rights that are afforded to everyone, but that are of particular interest to children 
and the topic under discussion, include the right to equality,32 and the rights to 
personal autonomy construed from the rights to privacy;33 freedom of religion, belief 
and opinion;34 freedom of expression;35 and freedom of association.36 
 
The right to equality is guaranteed in section 9 of the Constitution. Section 9(1) 
guarantees everyone the right to equality before the law and equal protection of the 
law. Sections 9(3) and 9(4) prohibit unfair discrimination by the state and by private 
entities on a non-exclusive list of grounds.37 One of the grounds listed on which 
unfair discrimination is prohibited is age. Any discrimination between some children 
and others will thus be subject to scrutiny to determine if it complies with the 
prohibition on unfair discrimination.38 
 
Like everyone else, children have the right to personal autonomy. Bekink and Brand 
raises the question of whether children have a composite right to individual self-
determination under the Constitution.39 If so, this would entitle them to choose their 
own lifestyle, friends, religion and opinions, regardless of the authority their parents 
are entitled to exercise towards them. They point out that the interest of children in 
maintaining their own autonomy should, however, be seen in the context of the 
relationship of dependence that of necessity exists between a child and his or her 
parents.40 Bekink and Brand further argue, and rightly so, that the exercise of the 
                                                 
31
  Section 39(1) of the Constitution. It is thus of significant importance to consider international law. 
Note also par 5 of this research for a more detailed discussion on the international law 
requirements relating to the topic under discussion. 
32
  Section 9 of the Constitution. 
33
  Section 14 of the Constitution. 
34
  Section 15 of the Constitution. 
35
  Section 16 of the Constitution. 
36
  Section 18 of the Constitution. 
37
  Bekink and Brand "Constitutional and International Protection of Children's Rights" 178. 
38
  Bekink and Brand "Constitutional and International Protection of Children's Rights" 178. 
39
  Bekink and Brand "Constitutional and International Protection of Children's Rights" 181. 
40
  Bekink and Brand "Constitutional and International Protection of Children's Rights" 181. 
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responsibilities of care and support a parent has towards a child limits a child's claim 
to self determination. This limitation can be justified by a parent's duty of care and 
support. However, as a child grows older and the duty of care and support 
diminishes, justification for such intrusion will become progressively more difficult to 
prove as the child's right to self-determination increases.41 
 
Apart from the aforementioned general autonomy rights, Friedman, Pantazis and 
Skelton argue that section 28(2) is flexible enough to include autonomy rights for 
children. They find support for this notion in two cases.42 Firstly, they note the courts' 
willingness in MEC for Education, KwaZulu Natal v Pillay,43 to accept children's 
rights to autonomy, particularly in the case of adolescent children. 44 In the said case 
it was held that the wearing of a nose stud by a 16 year-old girl was an expression of 
her Hindu culture and religion, a practice with which she identified. It was 
subsequently held by the court that the school was able to reasonably accommodate 
her by way of an exception to its code of conduct, and should do so. The court 
further remarked that children of the girl's age should increasingly be taking 
responsibility for their own actions and beliefs.45 Secondly, in Christian Lawyers 
South Africa v Minister of Health and Others (Reproductive Health Alliance as 
Amicus Curiae)46 the high court was concerned with the constitutionality of a law 
permitting girls below the age of 18 years to choose to terminate their pregnancies, 
provided they have the intellectual and emotional capacity for informed consent. The 
court found that the Termination of Pregnancy Act, which was based on the girl's 
capacity to decide rather than on a specific age, promoted the best interests of the 
child, as it was flexible and recognised that decisions taken to terminate pregnancy 
would depend on a girl's intellectual, psychological and emotional maturity, rather 
than her chronological age.47 
 
                                                 
41
  Bekink and Brand "Constitutional and International Protection of Children's Rights" 181. 
42
  Friedman, Pantazis and Skelton "Children's Rights" 47-2. 
43
  MEC for Education, KwaZulu Natal v Pillay 2008 1 SA 474 (CC). 
44
  Friedman, Pantazis and Skelton "Children's Rights" 47-2. 
45
  MEC for Education, KwaZulu Natal v Pillay 2008 1 SA 474 (CC) para 56. 
46
  Christian Lawyers South Africa v Minister of Health (Reproductive Health Alliance as Amicus 
Curiae) 2005 1 SA 509 (T) 528. 
47
  Christian Lawyers South Africa v Minister of Health (Reproductive Health Alliance as Amicus 
Curiae) 2005 1 SA 509 (T) 528. 
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The Milnerton case also serves as an illustration of the aforementioned acceptance 
of children's rights to autonomy. According to media reports the girl's parents 
suggested a boarding school as a solution to their current situation. The girl's 
request, however, not to be sent to a boarding school but to reside with a host family 
was granted by the judge assigned to the case.48 This suggests that the court found 
the girl (aged 16) of sufficient intellectual, psychological and emotional maturity to 
express an autonomous opinion on her future. 
  
3.2 Children's specific rights: section 28 
 
In recognition of children's vulnerability section 28(1) provides a range of rights which 
provide extra protection to children in certain areas, such as the right to a name and 
nationality, family or parental care, or appropriate alternative care when removed 
from the family. Section 28(2) provides further protection by stating that a child's 
interests are of paramount importance in every matter concerning the child. 
 
With due regard to the underlying theme of this article, section 28 (1)(b) and (c) 
respectively affords every child the right to family or parental care, appropriate 
alternative care if removed from the family environment, and the right to basic 
nutrition, shelter, basic health care services and social services. 
 
Section 28(1)(b) has three purposes. Firstly, it is aimed at the preservation of a 
healthy parent-child relationship and imposes an obligation on the state to respect 
existing family or parental care by limiting any interference to situations where it is 
justified.49 It should be noted that it does so from a child-centred approach rather 
than a parent's perspective, as it is the right of the child that is at stake.50 Moreover it 
is the child's right to family care or parental care that is protected and not the child's 
                                                 
48
  Legalbrief TODAY, 10 June 2010 available at http://www.legalbrief.co.za/article.php?story= 
20100610091458403 accessed on 15 June 2010. 
49
  Bekink and Brand "Constitutional and International Protection of Children's Rights" 185. An 
example of an infringement that would be justified would be in situations of ongoing child abuse. 
50
  In Patel v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 2 SA 343 (D) the court held that in deciding whether to 
deport the second applicant from South Africa in terms of the Aliens Control Act 96 of 1991 the 
right of his children to family or parental care had to be taken into account. See also Heystek v 
Heystek [2002] JOL 9297 (T) and F v F 2006 3 SA 42 (SCA). For an analysis of the constitutional 
rights parents may have because they are parents, see Carpenter 2008 TSAR 397. 
M BEKINK                                                                                 PER / PELJ 2012(15)1 
 
187 / 428 
 
 
right to family life.51 It has been argued that the Constitution deliberately did not 
include a "right to family life".52 This absence was raised in Ex Parte Chairperson of 
the Constitutional Assembly In Re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa Act, 1996.53 The court found that this absence did not preclude 
certification because it allowed for flexibility in the recognition of multicultural and 
multi-faith family forms in a diverse society. The inclusion of the right to family life, 
according to the court, might have given rise to a dominance of one approach above 
that of another.54 I agree with Sloth-Nielsen and Kruger that the fact that neither the 
children's clause nor the Bill of Rights affords parents or children the right to family 
life may hamper the development of a children's rights philosophy and will further 
undoubtedly have a negative effect on the institution of the family.55 The importance 
of children growing up in a healthy environment where they can form strong 
psychological bonds with family members can hardly be over-emphasised. Kruger 
points out - and rightly so - that if children are not initially assisted within a stable 
family environment to develop into rational adults, there would be no point in 
attempting to safeguard their rights to autonomy and self-determination.56 
 
Notwithstanding this lacuna, Bekink and Brand argue that the child's right to family or 
parental care shows a preference for care in the context of a family and places an 
obligation on the state to respect the institution of the family as the context within 
which the care can be provided. This would imply that the state should have regard 
to the protection of the cohesion of the family as a goal in itself.57 Despite the non-
inclusion of the right to family life, this right has been emphasized in several cases.58 
In S v M (Centre for Child Law as Amicus Curiae)59 the Constitutional Court found 
that section 28(1) read with the best interest principle in section 28(2) requires the 
                                                 
51
  Kruger Judicial Interference with Parental Authority 478. 
52
  Skelton "Constitutional Protection of Children's Rights" 278. 
53
  Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly In Re Certification of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa Act, 1996 1996 4 SA 744 (CC). 
54
  Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly In Re Certification of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa Act, 1996 1996 4 SA 744 (CC) [96]-[103]. 
55
  Kruger Judicial Interference with Parental Authority 506; Sloth-Nielsen 1995 SAJHR 418. 
56
  Kruger Judicial Interference with Parental Authority 507. 
57
  Bekink and Brand "Constitutional and International Protection of Children's Rights" 186 
58
  Dawood v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 3 SA 936 (CC); B v M [2006] 9 BCLR 1034 (W); and 
Patel v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 2 SA 343 (D). 
59
  S v M (Centre for Child Law as Amicus Curiae) 2008 3 SA 232 (CC) para 20. 
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law to make the best possible effort to avoid where possible any breakdown of family 
or parental care that may put children at risk. 
 
The second purpose of section 28(1) is to identify the parties who must furnish such 
care. According to the Constitutional Court, section 28(1)(b) has direct horizontal 
application in that the duties these rights impose rest primarily on the parents and 
family and pass to the state only if the child's parents or family fail(s) or are/is unable 
to care for the child. Moreover sections 28(1)(b) and (c) must be read together. The 
state is thus responsible for ensuring that there are legal obligations to compel 
parents and the family to fulfil their responsibilities towards children. As the state 
fulfils this duty it is also under an obligation to create the necessary environment for 
parents and families to provide proper care to a child.60 In the absence of such care, 
where a child has been removed from the family, the state has a duty to provide 
alternative care. The fact that section 28(1)(b) has horizontal application between the 
parent and the child has a further implication in that South African law recognises 
that children can enforce fundamental rights against their parents. This undoubtedly 
raises the potential for conflict between the rights and interest of the parents and the 
rights and interest of the child, and the courts will have the task of balancing or 
weighing these competing rights. Thirdly, section 28(1) requires that care of a certain 
quality be provided.61 
 
The particular recognition given in section 28(1)(d) of the Bill of Rights of children's 
rights not to be maltreated, neglected, abused or degraded is also of significance to 
the topic under discussion. This section imposes a duty on parents as well as the 
state to refrain from these forms of treatment. It also places a positive duty on the 
state to intervene in situations of ongoing maltreatment or abuse, for instance by 
removing a child from such a situation. This duty is given legislative effect by certain 
provisions of the Children's Act which empower police officers, social workers and 
other authorised persons to remove children from their homes to a place of safety 
                                                 
60
  Bannatyne v Bannatyne (Commissioner for Gender Equality, as Amicus Curiae) 2003 2 SA 363 
(CC); Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) and Minister 
of Health v Treatment Action Campaign 2 2002 5 SA 721 (CC). 
61
  Section 28(1)(c) of the Constitution. See also Heaton South African Family Law 273 for more on 
the scope of the care. 
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under certain circumstances.62 To meet its positive duty to intervene in situations of 
ongoing abuse, the state acts in conflict with a child's right to family or parental care. 
This creates the need for a flexible test against which to decide if a decision to 
intervene is constitutionally sound.63 Section 150 of the Children's Act provides some 
assistance by listing criteria for decisions for the removal of children from their family 
homes. What is of significance is that the Children's Act firstly specifically defines the 
terms abuse64 and neglect65 and secondly does so in a holistic way by also including 
in the definitions the responsibility placed on parents to provide for a child's basic 
physical, intellectual, emotional and social needs.66 These needs (with the exclusion 
of the first, which is more visible) vary from child to child and are, due to the nature 
thereof, open to subjective interpretation by those involved. Caution should thus be 
taken by judges to do so on an informed basis and in the light of the individual child's 
position and circumstances.67 
  
The Bill of Rights also recognises children's rights to legal representation in that 
section 28(1)(h) states "that every child has the right to have a legal practitioner 
assigned to the child by the state and at state expense, in civil proceedings affecting 
the child, if substantial injustice would otherwise result". The obvious significance of 
section 28 is that it directly manifests and extends the right to legal 
assistance/representation by the state and at state expense, in civil proceedings in 
cases which would affect the child and if substantial injustice would otherwise result 
without such assistance. Section 28(1)(h) thus ensures the child a right to participate 
in matters affecting him or her. This affords a child an own representative and gives 
effect to article 12 of the CRC.68 What would be regarded as matters which would 
                                                 
62
  Chapters 9, 12 and 13 of the Children's Act 38 of 2005. 
63
  Bekink and Brand "Constitutional and International Protection of Children's Rights" 188-189. 
64
  "Abuse" in relation to a child means "any form of harm or ill-treatment deliberately inflicted on a 
child, and includes- (a) assaulting a child or inflicting any other form of deliberate injury on a 
child; (b) sexually abusing a child or allowing a child to be sexually abused; (c) bullying by 
another child; (d) a labour practice that exploits a child; or (e) exposing or subjecting a child to 
behaviour that may harm the child psychologically or emotionally".  
65
  "Neglect" in relation to a child means a failure in the exercise of parental responsibilities to 
provide for the child's basic physical, intellectual, emotional or social needs.  
66
  Chapter 1 of the Children's Act 38 of 2005. 
67
  In this regard a report or recommendation from a social worker, the family advocate or suitably 
qualified person may be of significant value. See also Heaton 2009 Journal of Juridical Science 
9. 
68
  Refer to paragraph 5 for a discussion on article 12 of the CRC. See for example also Lubbe v Du 
Plessis 2001 4 SA 57 (C); R v H 2005 6 SA 535 (C) 539; J v J 2008 6 SA 30 (C); De Groot v De 
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affect the child and circumstances which would result in a substantial injustice if legal 
aid is not provided is an open question and would depend on the circumstances of 
each case.69 Some guidance can be found in jurisprudence. In Du Toit v Minister of 
Welfare & Population Development70 the Constitutional Court referred to this section 
in relation to the appointment of a curator ad litem for very young children. In Centre 
for Child Law v Minister of Home Affairs71 the court reiterated the importance of legal 
representation for children in terms of section 28(1)(h) and subsequently ordered 
that a legal representative be appointed by the state for the child concerned. This 
section thus forms a platform for children to be directly involved in civil litigation and 
for their legal representatives to place the children's views before the court. In Soller 
v G72 Satchwell J pointed out that there are: 
 
... few proceedings of greater importance to a child/young adult of K's [the boys] 
age than those which determine the circumstances of his residence and family life, 
under whose authority he should live and how he should exercise the opportunity to 
enjoy and continue to develop a relationship with both living parents and his 
siblings. 
 
In Pillay73, Langa CJ remarked that the need for a child's voice to be heard is 
perhaps even more acute when it concerns children who should be increasingly 
taking responsibilities for their own actions and beliefs (in this case a 16 year-old 
girl). The court's stance on "substantial injustice" is also of particular significance as it 
indicated that it referred to civil proceedings that are of crucial importance to a child's 
current life and future developments.74 The Children's Act confirms this approach in 
that a child's views must be given due weight in accordance with his or her age, 
                                                                                                                                                        
Groot (Unreported Case No. 1408/2009 (EC HC), 10 September 2009) where specific attention 
was given to article 12 of the CRC. 
69
  For more on this point refer to Bekink and Brand "Constitutional and International Protection of 
Children's Rights" 193; Du Toit "Legal Representation of Children" 93; and Bekink and Bekink 
2009 Speculium Juris 23. See for example also Soller v G 2003 5 SA 430 (W); Rosen v Havenga 
2005 JOL 15235 (C); F v F 2006 3 SA 42 (SCA), and Legal Aid Board v R 2009 2 SA 262 (D). 
70
  Du Toit v Minister of Welfare & Population Development 2003 2 SA 198 (CC); and AD v DW 
(Centre for Child Law as Amicus Curiae, Department of Social Development as Intervening 
Party) 2006 6 SA 51 (W); 2007 5 SA 184 (SCA); 2008 3 SA 183 (CC). 
71
  Centre for Child Law v Minister of Home Affairs 2005 6 SA 50 (TPD) 58I-59C/D. 
72
  Soller v G 2003 5 SA 430 (W) 434-435 para 7. 
73
  MEC for Education, KwaZulu Natal v Pillay 2008 1 SA 474 (CC) para 56. In Ex Parte Van 
Niekerk: In re Van Niekerk v Van Niekerk 2005 JOL 14218 (T) the children were joined as parties 
themselves in order to give them better opportunities for participation. Such a legal 
representative can be appointed by the Legal Aid Board and it is not necessary to approach the 
High Court in each case. See Legal Aid Board v R 2009 2 SA 263 (D). 
74
  MEC for Education, KwaZulu Natal v Pillay 2008 1 SA 474 (CC) para 435d. 
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maturity and stage of development in any matter concerning that child.75 The 
Children's Act also grants every child the right to bring or be assisted to bring a 
matter to court.76 
 
Section 28(2) provides further protection for children by stating that a child's interests 
are of paramount importance in every matter concerning the child and thus 
entrenches the paramount principle as a right in itself.77 From existing case law it has 
become clear that section 28(2) has become a significant principle in the Bill of 
Rights jurisprudence regarding the rights of children.78 Despite being a right in itself it 
has also been used to develop the meaning of other rights in the Bill of Rights, and 
to determine the ambit of and limit other competitive rights.79 
 
Section 28(2) elevates the child's best interests to the supreme issue in every matter 
that concerns the child. This does not mean, however, that it serves as a trump to 
automatically override other rights, or that other constitutional rights are unimportant 
and may simple be ignored. The correct approach is to apply the paramount principle 
in a meaningful way without unduly obliterating other valuable constitutionally 
protected interests/rights.80 This is in line with the notion that there is no 
constitutional hierarchy of rights. The application of section 28(2) may thus also 
involve the weighing up of various competing interests/rights and the limitation of the 
right itself. The fact that the best interests of the child are paramount does not imply 
                                                 
75
  Section 10 of the Children's Act 38 of 2005. This section came into operation on 1 July 2007. See 
also Kassan 2003 De Jure 164; Robinson 2007 THRHR 263. 
76
  Section 14 of the Children's Act 38 of 2005. 
77
  Fraser v Naude 1999 1 SA 1 (CC); Jooste v Botha 2000 2 SA 199 (T); Minister of Welfare and 
Population Development v Fitzpatrick 2000 3 SA 422 (CC); Du Toit v Minister of Welfare & 
Population Development 2003 2 SA 198 (CC); Heaton South African Family Law 276; Heaton 
1990 THRHR 95; Bekink 2003 THRHR 254-255; Bekink and Bekink 2004 De Jure 21; Barrie 
2011 TSAR 126.  
78
  Fraser v Naude 1999 1 SA 1 (CC); Jooste v Botha 2000 2 SA 199 (T); Minister of Welfare and 
Population Development v Fitzpatrick 2000 3 SA 422 (CC); Du Toit v Minister of Welfare & 
Population Development 2003 2 SA 198 (CC); Heaton South African Family Law 276; Heaton 
1990 THRHR 95; Bekink 2003 THRHR 254-255; Bekink and Bekink 2004 De Jure 21; Barrie 
2011 TSAR 126. 
79
  Minister of Welfare and Population Development v Fitzpatrick 2000 3 SA 422 (CC); Du Toit v 
Minister of Welfare and Population Development 2003 2 SA 198 (CC); Hay v B 2003 3 SA 492 
(W); Bannatyne v Bannatyne (Commissioner for Gender Equality, as Amicus Curiae) 2003 2 SA 
363 (CC); De Reuck v Director of Public Prosecutions, Witwatersrand Local Division 2003 2 SA 
363 (CC). 
80
  Heaton South African Family Law 277; Skelton "Constitutional Protection of Children's Rights" 
280; Friedman, Pantazis and Skelton "Children's Rights" 47, 40-46. 
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that the right is absolute. Sometimes the best interests of the child or children in 
general, as odd as this may sound, may even limit a child's best interests.81 
 
In Centre for Child Law v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development82, 
Justice Cameron held that paramount means that "...the child's interests are more 
important than anything else, but does not mean that everything else is unimportant". 
In the scenario given on page 2 of the 16 year old Milnerton girl, this therefore does 
not mean that the child's interest are of such importance that the cohesion of the 
family becomes unimportant, but should also be a factor to be considered by the 
court before taking a decision to grant the girl her wish to live semi-independently. 
The paramount principle does, however, require a truly child-centred approach, 
which in turn "requires a close and individualised examination of the precise real life 
situation of the particular child involved".83 This entails that when determining the 
child's best interests the courts must evaluate each individual case or situation in the 
light of the individual child's position and the effect that the situation is having or will 
probably have on the individual child.84 This child-centred and individualistic 
approach will also serve as a valuable means to avert the possible misuse of the 
judicial system by children just wanting to get what their friends have. Applied to the 
given scenario of the Milnerton girl, a judge should thus not unquestioningly apply 
prevailing social and cultural norms or social theories of what is the best for children 
in general; nor should he or she simply apply his or her personal views, or those of 
society or of the child's parents.85 This is not to say that social theories and norms 
and cultural values are not important. On the contrary, they are very relevant in 
terms of a contextualised approach to determining the best interests of the child. But 
the focus of such factors must be of relevance and must impact on the individual 
child.86 Thus the question is whether or not the conservative manner in which the 
girl's parents treated her has relevance to her and has impacted either negatively or 
positively on the girl herself. The socio-cultural beliefs and opinions of the parents 
                                                 
81
  Skelton "Constitutional Protection of Children's Rights" 282-283; Friedman, Pantazis and Skelton 
"Children's Rights" 47, 40-46; Sonderrup v Tondelli 2001 1 SA 1171 (CC); Harris v Minister of 
Education 2001 4 SA 1297(CC). 
82
  Centre for Child Law v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 2009 6 SA 632 (CC) 
para [29]. 
83
  S v M (Centre for Child Law as Amicus Curiae) 2008 3 SA 232 (CC) para 24. 
84
  Heaton 2009 Journal of Juridical Science 9. 
85
  Heaton 2009 Journal of Juridical Science 9. 
86
  Heaton 2009 Journal of Juridical Science 9. 
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and their impact on the specific child should, however, be considered only if and to 
the extent that a parent's religious and cultural beliefs and practices and conduct are 
shown by reliable means to impact negatively on the development and happiness of 
the child concerned. Only then should any of these factors weigh with a court in 
making an order in respect of that child.87 
 
It is accepted, however, that perceptions of morality and social standards of what is 
acceptable vary from time to time and from one society to another. This is also true 
of South Africa with its diverse society. The South African Constitution recognises 
this diversity and the Constitutional Court has repeatedly held that our constitutional 
values include tolerance of and respect for this diversity.88 However tolerating this 
diversity demands a contextualised approach to the best interests of the child. The 
religion and culture in which the specific child is growing up must be taken into 
account. This is also recognised in section 7(1) of the Children's Act in that the 
child's need to remain in the care of his or her parents, family and extended family 
and to maintain a connection with that family, extended family, culture and tradition 
as well as his or her social and cultural development should be taken into account 
when determining a child's best interests.89 This does not mean that the child's social 
and cultural development and background should be applied blindly when 
determining his or her best interests. In this regard section 12(1) of the Children's Act 
specifically affords every child the right not to be subjected to social, cultural and 
religious practices which are detrimental to his or her well-being. The challenge is 
thus to respect diverse social and cultural values but to do so without compromising 
the best interests of the child. 
                                                 
87
  Van Heerden "Judicial Interference" 546. In this regard a report or recommendation from the 
family advocate, social worker or suitably qualified person may be regarded as reliable means. 
See s 29(5) of the Children's Act 38 of 2005. 
88
  See the Preamble of the Constitution. See also for example Christian Education South Africa v 
Minister of Education 2000 4 SA 757 (CC) para 23, 24; and MEC for Education: Kwa-Zulu Natal 
v Pillay 2008 1 SA 474 (CC) para 76. 
89
  Subsections (1)(f), (g) and (h) of the Children's Act 38 of 2005. 
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4 The role of the Children's Act 
 
As was stated in the introduction, South Africa has also recently enacted a new 
Children's Act,90 which sets out to give effect to certain rights of children as 
contained in the Constitution. This includes inter alia principles relating to care and 
protection; to partial care; to prevention and early intervention and definitions of 
parental responsibilities and rights and so forth.91 Chapter 3 of the Children's Act has 
codified the common law regarding parental authority and has reconceptualised what 
was previously referred to as "parental authority" as "parental responsibilities and 
rights".92 In terms of the Children's Act the parental responsibilities and rights that a 
person may have in respect of a child include the right to care for the child, to 
maintain contact with the child, to act as guardian of the child and to contribute to the 
maintenance of the child.93 
 
The focus of this contribution is, however, on the clarification of the factors in the 
Children's Act that are to be considered in an application for the termination, 
suspension or restriction of parental responsibilities and rights in the best interest of 
the child. In this regard sections 7 and 28 of the Children's Act are of particular 
importance. They will be discussed in reverse order. 
 
Section 28 of the Children's Act in particular deals with the court-ordered termination, 
extension, suspension or restriction of parental responsibilities and rights and states 
as follows: 
 
(1)  A person referred to in subsection (3) may apply to the High Court, a divorce  
court in a divorce matter or a children's court for an order- 
(a) suspending for a period, or terminating, any or all of the parental 
responsibilities and rights which a specific person has in respect of a child; 
or 
                                                 
90
  Children's Act 38 of 2005. 
91
  See the preamble and introduction of the Children's Act 38 of 2005. 
92
  Skelton "Parental Responsibilities and Rights" 63. 
93
  Section 18 of the Children's Act 38 of 2005. This entails that parents may in respect of the 
exercise of their parental responsibilities and rights inter alia decide where a child is to reside, 
with whom the child may associate, which school the child is to attend, what religious education a 
child may receive and in which language the child is to be brought up etc. See Heaton South 
African Family Law 284. 
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(b) extending or circumscribing the exercise by that person of any or all of 
the parental responsibilities and rights which a specific person has in 
respect of a child. 
(2) An application in terms of subsection (1) may be combined with an 
application in terms of section 23 for the assignment of contact and care in 
respect of the child to the applicant in terms of that section. 
(3) An application for an order referred to in subsection (1) may be brought- 
(a) by a co-holder of parental responsibilities and rights in respect of the 
child; 
(b) by any other person having a sufficient interest in the care, 
protection, well being or development of the child; 
(c) by the child acting with leave of the court;  
(d) in the child's interest by any other person, acting with leave of the 
court; or  
(e) by a family advocate or the representative of any interested organ of 
state.  
(4) When considering such application the court must take into account- 
(a) the best interests of the child; 
(b) the relationship between the child and the person whose parental 
responsibilities and rights are being challenged; 
(c) the degree of commitment that the person has shown towards the 
child; and; 
(d) any other factor that should, in the opinion of the court be taken into 
account. 
Section 28(1) authorises the suspension for a period or the termination of any or all 
of the parental responsibilities and rights a specific person has. While the first of 
these scenarios is extremely extensive ("termination of any or all") and should thus 
be used sparingly and with due consideration, the second is less restrictive in that it 
specifically states that such suspension of parental responsibilities and rights is for a 
specific period only and can therefore not operate indefinitely.94 Applications for 
extending parental responsibilities and rights may be granted as well as applications 
to circumscribe (to limit or define) such rights. The aforementioned applications may 
be combined with an application for care and contact in terms of section 23. This 
entails that an application to terminate or suspend parental rights and responsibilities 
may be combined with an application to assign care and contact to another person.95 
The applicants who might possibly bring such an application include a co-holder of 
parental responsibilities and rights; any other person having a sufficient interest in 
the care, protection, wellbeing or development of the child; the child96 himself or 
herself acting with leave of the court; any other person who has an interest in the 
child, acting with leave of the court; or a family advocate or the representative of any 
                                                 
94
  Heaton "Parental Responsibilities and Rights" 3-23. 
95
  I assume that this was the case with the 16 year-old Milnerton girl. 
96
  This grants further recognition of a child's right to participation in matters concerning that child. 
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interested organ of state. It is noteworthy that social development authorities can 
also bring an application of the kind envisaged in section 28.97 
 
When considering such an application the court must take the following factors into 
account: the best interests of the child; the relationship between the child and the 
person whose parental responsibilities and rights are being challenged; the degree 
of commitment that the person has shown towards the child; and any other factor 
that should in the opinion of the court be taken into account.98 With reference to the 
topic under discussion "any other factor" may include the cultural, social and 
religious circumstances, interests and needs of the individual child as well as the 
child's specific wishes. 
 
It is without doubt no coincidence that the requirement of the best interest is one of 
the factors that has to be considered by a court when exercising its discretion, as the 
standard has been described as the golden thread that runs through the whole fabric 
of the South African law relating to children.99 The concept of "the best interests of 
the child" has, however, been widely criticised for its vagueness and 
indeterminacy.100 Before the Children's Act was enacted, South African legislation 
did not provide a list of factors to be taken into account by courts when determining 
the best interest principle, and the courts had to rely on the common law. In this 
regard the most comprehensive list of factors was proposed in McCall v McCall101, in 
which thirteen factors were identified in an open-ended list specifically designed for 
resolving custody disputes. 
 
Section 7(1) of the Children's Act is of significant value as it partly addresses this 
criticism by listing fourteen factors that must be taken into consideration whenever 
the best interests of the child are determined.102 These include the nature of the 
personal relationship between the child and the child's parents;103 the attitude of the 
                                                 
97
  Sections 28(3)(e) and 135 of the Children's Act 38 of 2005. 
98
  Section 28(4) of the Children's Act 38 of 2005. Own emphasis added. 
99
  Clark 2000 Stell LR 3. 
100
  Clark 2000 Stell LR 15; Bekink and Bekink 2004 De Jure 22; Heaton 1990 THRHR 95; Van 
Heerden "Judicial Interference" 503. 
101
  McCall v McCall 1994 3 SA 201 (C) 205B-G. 
102
  Section 7(1)(a)-(n) of the Children's Act 38 of 2005. 
103
  Note: all references to the parents include "or any specific parent and any other care-giver or 
person relevant to the circumstances". See s 7(1) of the Children's Act 38 of 2005. 
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parents towards the child; the capacity of the parents to provide for the (emotional 
and intellectual) needs of the child; the likely effect of any change in the child's 
circumstances; the practical difficulty and expense of a child having contact with the 
parents; the need for the child to remain in the care of and to maintain a connection 
with his or her family, extended family, culture or tradition; the child' age, maturity, 
developmental stage, gender, background and any other relevant characteristics of 
the child; the child's physical and emotional security and his or her intellectual, 
emotional, social and cultural development; any disability or any chronic illness that a 
child may have or may suffer from; the need for a child to be brought up within a 
stable (or nearly stable family environment; the need to protect the child from any 
physical or psychological harm; and the taking of actions or decisions that would 
minimise the exposure of a child to legal or administrative proceedings. 
 
When evaluating the Act's list of fourteen factors two issues present themselves as 
being of concern. Firstly, although the act emphasises the needs of the child and his 
or her physical and emotional security, a child's preferences are excluded from the 
list. It can, however, perhaps be argued that this is catered for in section 10 of the 
Children's Act, which specifically allows for child participation in court proceedings.104 
Secondly, the list provided in the Children's Act is not an open-ended one, as was 
the case in McCall v McCall, where a court could consider any other factors which it 
considered to be relevant. This may be a limitation in practice, although judicial 
officers have the discretion to consider other factors where relevant.105 The inclusion 
of "any other factor that should, in the opinion of the court be taken into account" in 
section 28(4)(d) of the Children's Act eliminates this problem for the application of 
section 28 at least. In addition it should be noted that although the fourteen factors 
give particular recognition to the well-being of the child, emphasis is also placed on 
the importance of the need for a child to remain in the care of and to maintain a 
connection with his or her parents, family and extended family, culture or tradition. A 
stable family environment should thus be protected where possible.106 
 
                                                 
104
  Skelton and Proudlock "Interpretation, Objects, Application and Implementation" 2-8. 
105
  In B v S 1995 3 SA 571 (A) the court held at 572 that an application for the variation of an 
existing access order really involves a judicial investigation into a child's best interest and may 
even allow a court to call evidence mero motu. The court should also if necessary call oral 
evidence from the parties themselves to enable it to form its own opinion. 
106
  Sections 7(1)(f) and (k) of the Children's Act 38 of 2005. 
M BEKINK                                                                                 PER / PELJ 2012(15)1 
 
198 / 428 
 
 
Finally, an evaluation of the topic under discussion would not be complete without 
taking account of regional and international standards. A brief analysis of the most 
important international and regional instruments will thus be given. 
 
5 The influence of international and regional law 
 
In terms of section 39(1), when interpreting the rights set out in the Bill of Rights, 
such as the best interests of the child, a court, tribunal or forum must consider 
international law and may consider foreign law. The importance of international law 
is therefore self-evident and has been entrenched in the new Constitutional context. 
With reference to the topic under discussion, the following international provisions 
are of importance. 
 
(a) Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) (1948): Article 16 sees 
the family as the natural and fundamental group unit of society, which is 
entitled to protection by society and the state. Families should enjoy a 
standard of living adequate for their health and wellbeing. Under article 12 
of the UDHR no one shall be subject to arbitrary interference with his 
privacy, family and home. Special recognition is also afforded to mothers 
and children in terms of article 25 in that they are entitled to "special care 
and assistance". The UDHR's provisions also include the right to freedom 
of religion, thought and conscience and the right to freely participate in the 
cultural life of the community.107 Other associated rights include inter alia 
the right to equality and dignity.108 
 
(b) International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR) (1967): The covenant in article 10(1) particularly recognises that 
"[t]he widest possible protection and assistance should be accorded to the 
family, which is the natural and fundamental group unit of society, 
particularly for its establishment and while it is responsible for the care and 
education of dependent children". In addition article 10(3) places an 
                                                 
107
  Articles 18 and 27 of the UDHR. 
108
   Articles 7 and 1 of the UDHR respectively. See Mtshaulana, Dugard and Botha Documents on 
International Law 172. It should be noted that at the time of adoption by the United Nations 
General Assembly in 1948, South Africa abstained from voting in favour of the Declaration. 
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obligation on states not to discriminate for reasons of parentage or other 
conditions, when assisting and protecting children and young persons.109 
The Covenant's provisions also include inter alia the right to self-
determination,110 the right to equality,111 the right to health,112 the right to 
education113 and the right to a cultural life114. 
 
(c) Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)(1989): In its preamble the 
CRC proclaims that children are entitled to special care and protection and 
that the family, as the fundamental group of society and the natural 
environment for the growth and wellbeing of all of its members and 
particularly children, should be afforded the necessary protection and 
assistance. This underlines the notion that although the CRC is child-
centred it also places a high value on the family as a unit. Articles 5 and 18 
of the CRC are of particular importance here, as they set out the 
responsibilities, rights and duties of parents. The rights of parents and 
other legal guardians are to provide "appropriate direction and guidance" 
in the exercise of rights by children. This should be done with the 
necessary recognition of children's evolving capacities. Parents and the 
family are therefore not entitled to unlimited discretion in the exercise of 
their responsibilities and rights. Although article 18 recognises parents as 
the primary caregivers, it places an obligation on state parties to assist 
parents in performing their child-rearing responsibilities and to ensure the 
development of institutions, facilities and services for the care of 
children.115 In line with this, article 3 of the CRC states that in all actions 
concerning children, the best interest of the child shall be a primary 
consideration. Where parents and the family fail to protect the child or to 
                                                 
109
  Article 10(3) of the ICESCR. See Dugard International Law 246. South Africa signed the ICESCR 
on 3 October 1994, but has yet to ratify it. 
110
  Article 2 of the ICESCR. 
111
  Article 3 of the ICESCR. 
112
  Article 12 of the ICESCR. 
113
  Article 13 of the ICESCR. 
114
  Article 15 of the ICESCR. 
115
  Article 18 of the CRC. South Africa signed the CRC on 29 January 1993 and ratified it on 16 
June 1995. 
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act in his or her best interest the state has to intervene and may even 
separate the child from his or her family.116 
 
The CRC also recognises that children generally can play a more active role 
in decision–making within the family life. Article 12 specifically recognises that 
children are individuals in their own right and should be afforded the 
opportunity to express their own views in matters affecting them. These views 
should be given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the 
child.117 
 
Finally the CRC also recognises the rights to freedom of expression118, 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion119 and the right to the promotion 
of the social, spiritual and moral wellbeing of children.120 
 
The position expressed in international instruments is echoed in most regional 
human rights instruments. For example section 18(1) of the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples Rights121 recognises the family as the natural unit and basis of 
society and places a duty on state parties to assist and protect the family. The family 
is also seen as the custodian of moral and traditional values recognised by the 
community.122 The African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights also recognises 
that every individual has duties towards his or her family and society, the State and 
other legally recognised communities and the international community. Furthermore 
the rights and freedoms of each individual should be exercised with due regard to 
the rights of others, collective security, morality and the common interest.123 
 
                                                 
116
  Article 9(1) of the CRC. 
117
  This has bearing on the approach of Gillick v West Norfolk Area Health Authority 1985 3 All ER 
402. 
118
  Article 13 of the CRC. 
119
  Article 14 of the CRC. 
120
  Article 17 of the CRC. 
121
  The OAU Assembly of the Heads of State and Government adopted the Charter in 1981. It 
entered into force in 1986 and has been ratified by all fifty-three member states. 
122
  Article 27 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights. 
123
  Articles 27, 28 and 29 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights. 
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The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (commonly referred to as 
the African Children's Charter),124 like the African Charter on Human and Peoples 
Rights, also places emphasis on the family as the natural unit and basis of society. 
Children are therefore entitled to enjoy parental care and to reside with their 
parents.125 This Charter furthermore reaffirms states' responsibility to protect and 
assist families. These responsibilities include inter alia material assistance, support 
programmes and care services and facilities for the children of working parents.126 
Special protection is afforded to children in terms inter alia of the right to survival and 
development,127 to education,128 health and health services,129 and protection from 
child abuse and torture.130 In addition, children are also afforded the rights to 
freedom of expression, thought, conscience and religion.131 The overriding principle 
of the Charter is that in all matters, the best interests of the child shall be the primary 
consideration.132 Member states of the African Charter on Human and Peoples 
Rights and the African Children's Charter are furthermore under an obligation to 
undertake legislative and other measures to give effect to the rights and freedoms 
protected in the Charters.133 
 
Apart from the rights afforded to children in this Charter, certain duties are placed on 
the child as in the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights. This stems from 
the view of the child as being part of a community.134 Children have duties towards 
their parents, family and society, the state and other legally recognised communities 
and the international community. The child therefore has to work towards the 
cohesion of the family, to respect his parents, superiors and elders at all times and to 
assist them in case of need, for example.135 These duties are qualified, however, in 
that they are subject to a child's age and ability and such limitations as may be 
                                                 
124
  The Charter was adopted in 1990, but came into force only on 29 November 1999. 
125
  Article 19 of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child. 
126
  Articles 18(1) and 20(2) of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child. 
127
  Article 5 of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child. 
128
  Article 11 of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child. 
129
  Article 14 of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child. 
130
  Article 16 of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child. 
131
  Articles 7 and 9 of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child. 
132
  Own emphasis added. Whilst the CRC sees the best interest principle as "a" consideration the 
African Children's Charter places an even higher regard hereto by making it "the" primary 
consideration. 
133
  Respectively a 62 and a 42 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights and the African 
Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child. 
134
  Viljoen "African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child" 339. 
135
  Article 31(a) of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child. 
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contained in the Charter.136 A child's duties to respect his or her parents and elders 
"at all times" have to be reconciled with a child's right to freedom of expression, 
association and thought, and ultimately the best interests of the child, which shall be 
the primary consideration.  
 
6 Conclusion 
 
The significance of the family as the natural unit and basis for society and the 
importance of children growing up in a stable family environment where strong 
psychological bonds between family members can be formed can hardly be 
overemphasised.137 This idealism, contained in international and regional legal 
instruments, is mirrored in the Constitution and Children's Act of South Africa.138 
These documents, however, also recognise that although children are part of the 
family unit they are at the same time bearers of individual rights. The possibility of 
potential conflict between the interests of children and adults is thus also foreseen. 
Despite the sanctity of the family unit this does not mean that families are above 
public scrutiny. It can generally be accepted that situations may arise where the 
welfare of the child may demand that the child be deprived of the opportunity to 
maintain an established relationship, for instance where a child has been abused by 
parents. 
 
When confronted with problematic situations and balancing or weighing competing 
rights and interests concerning children the best interests principle is still the most 
important factor to be taken into account.139 The best interests principle, the founding 
principle of children's rights, however, is anchored in the family140 and any break 
between the child and the family should be carefully considered. In an attempt to 
resolve disputes between parents and their children, the relevant provisions of the 
Constitution and Children's Act must be carefully considered and must be balanced 
and tested in relation to each other for constitutional consistency and compliance.141 
Courts should do so from a child-centred approach which entails a close and 
                                                 
136
  Article 31 of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child. 
137
  Kruger Judicial Interference with Parental Authority 507. 
138
  Section 28 of the Constitution and ss 7 and 28 of the Children's Act 38 of 2005. 
139
  Hay v B 2003 3 SA 492 (W). 
140
  McCall v McCall 1994 3 SA 201 (C) 205B-G. 
141
  Own emphasis added. 
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individualised examination of the precise real-life situation of the child involved.142 
The child's views should also be heard and given respectful and careful 
consideration as children's interests do not always correlate with those of their 
parents.143 The focus should thus be on the impact that the socio-cultural beliefs and 
practices of the parents have on the specific child. This should be considered only if 
it can be shown by reliable means to impact negatively on the development and 
happiness of the child concerned.144 
 
The relationship between parents and their children is a very personal and 
sometimes fragile one. This domain forms part of the world of morality and not even 
the state should interfere in this inner sanctity unless the parents' conduct towards 
the child is harmful, abusive or amounts to unlawfulness. When the conduct is not in 
the best interests of the child or contravenes any other of the rights afforded to the 
child in the Constitution, which is the supreme law of the Republic, such conduct is 
inconsistent with the principles of the Constitution and thus invalid to the extent of its 
inconsistency.145 A court adjudicating such a matter must declare such inconsistency 
to be invalid and may make an order that is just and equitable.146 Such an order may 
include the removal of a child from his or her family environment.147 Possible less 
restrictive solutions should, however, at least also be considered.148 
 
The fact that disagreement is part of life and occurs even in a healthy, normal family 
relationship should not be left out of the equation. Children and parents will disagree 
on certain "family rules". When parents are acting within the boundaries of the law, 
even though they are conservative, and their actions do not reflect any abuse or 
neglect, their responsibilities and rights will take preference above the rights of their 
children, for without this recognition the value of the family unit as the natural and 
fundamental unit of society will not be recognised. Children's mere dislike and 
                                                 
142
  S v M (Centre for Child Law as Amicus Curiae) 2008 3 SA 232 (CC) para 24. 
143
  Section 28(1)(h) of the Constitution. 
144
  See Van Heerden "Judicial Interference" 497. 
145
  Sections 2 and 172 of the Constitution. 
146
  Sections 2 and 172 of the Constitution. 
147
  Section 28(1)(b) of the Constitution and Chapter 9 of the Children's Act 38 of 2005. 
148
  In the scenario given on page 2 of the 16 year-old Milnerton girl, one may argue that the order 
given is quite extreme, as very restricted contact between the child and her parents is allowed. 
Unfortunately information on the case is very restricted, as explained in note 8. The only 
alternative to the removal of the child that was considered but rejected by the child was the 
possibility of a boarding school, according to news reports. 
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personal preferences in their upbringing cannot alone and should not tip the scales 
of justice in their favour. Caution should be taken in the interpretation of the 
legislative framework not to encourage children to break the parent-child relationship 
on a mere whim, as an overemphasis of children's rights may result in the 
destruction of the family.149 
 
It should also be remembered that although the best interests principle is still the 
most important factor to be taken into account when balancing competing rights 
regarding children, this right can be considered as a temporary right which exists to 
protect the child during his or her vulnerable stages. This right ends when a child 
reaches 18 years of age. The relationship between parents and a child, however, 
does not end when a child reaches adulthood. It is therefore suggested that the 
principle of the best interests of the child should be extended into the principle of the 
best interests of the person (although the latter principle is not an enforceable right 
under the Constitution).150 This entails that the important relationship between 
parents and their child is continued on an ongoing basis to the benefit of all of those 
involved in the family relationship. The long-term effect of the break in the parent-
child relationship should thus also be considered, for a break now may have serious 
detrimental consequences for the future relationship not only between the parent and 
the child but also in future between grandparents and their grandchildren. The family 
should therefore be kept intact, if that is at all possible. 
 
To conclude, the task of deciding what is in the best interests of the child is a very 
arduous and complex one and more often than not requires the Wisdom of Solomon. 
Any care or maintenance order made by a court is in itself an act of clairvoyance. No 
one can predict the future; hence the caution. Every effort should therefore be made 
by all of those involved to jealously search for the best interests of the child. 
                                                 
149
  It is therefore argued that line with s 150 of the Children's Act the situation should be of a serious 
nature before the removal of a child is considered. 
150
  For example, a parent's duty of support towards his or her 19 year-old "child" may continue if the 
"child" is not yet self-supporting and if such a duty is found to be in the best interest of the "child". 
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